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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY, a corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 14635

INTERMOUNTAIN FARMERS
ASSOCIATION, a corporation,
Defendant-Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING
AND SUPPORTING BRIEF

PETITION FOR REHEARING
Union Pacific Railroad Company, plaintiff and
respondent herein, petitions the court for a rehearing on
the following grounds:
1.

The Supreme Court erred in basing its

decision exclusively on the provisions of Section
5 of the subject lease agreement while failing to
consider or address the provisions of Sections 8
and 11 which were relied upon by the trial court
and which were urged by respondent at trial and
on appeal.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2.

The Supreme Court's reasoning with respect

to Section 5 of the subject lease agreement would
not preclude sustaining the trial court's judgment
on the theory of breach of contract under the
terms of Sections 8 and 11 of the agreement.
3.

The Supreme Court has a duty to affirm the

decision of the trial court if sustainable upon
any legal ground or theory apparent on the record.

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF REHEARING
NATURE OF CASE
This is a case where the Utah Supreme Court, in
reversing the decision of the trial court, failed to consider or address the basis upon which the trial court's
decision rested.

Instead, this court based its decision

exclusively upon a peripheral issue advanced by the appellant while ignoring the real issue in dispute which was decided in favor of the petitioner at trial.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
Petitioner seeks reargument and reconsideration of
the merits of this case; consideration of the issue upon
which the trial court's decision was based, said issue having been ignored by this court during the previous appeal;
and adherence to the self-imposed mandate of this court to
-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

affirm the decision of the trial court if sustainable upon
any legal ground apparent on the record.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case was submitted to the trial court on
stipulated facts.

A copy of that stipulation, without

exhibits, is attached hereto for the court's convenient
reference.
A complete statement of contractual provisions
upon which the trial court based its decision, and which
were ignored by this court on appeal, is as follows (Tr.
7-8):

Section 8. No building, platform or
other structure shall be erected or maintained and no material or obstruction of
any kind or character shall be placed,
piled, stored, stacked or maintained
closer than eight (8) feet six (6) inches
to the center line of the nearest track
of the Lessor; .
Section 11. The Lessee shall be liable for any and all injury or damage to
persons or property, of whatsoever nature
or kind, arising out of or contributed to
by any breach in whole or in part of any
covenant of this agreement.
[Emphasis
added.]
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN BASING ITS DECISION EXCLUSIVELY ON THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5
-3-
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OF THE SUBJECT LEASE AGREEMENT WHILE FAILING TO
CONSIDER OR ADDRESS THE PROVISIONS OF SECTIONS 8
AND 11 WHICH WERE RELIED UPON BY THE TRIAL COURT
AND WHICH WERE URGED BY RESPONDENT AT TRIAL AND
ON APPEAL.
At trial and on appeal petitioner actively asserted that it should recover on the basis of Sections 8 and 11
of the subject lease agreement under which appellant's liability attaches from breach of its contractual duty as
distinguished from liability arising solely from negligence
or tort.

The trial court's conclusions of law, providing

in part that "The court further concludes that the negligence of either party is not an issue nor a necessary element to the conclusion of this case"

(Tr. 155), are compati-

ble with this theory.
A complete statement of Sections 8 and 11 of the
subject lease is as follows

(Tr. 8):

Section 8. No building, platform or
other structure shall be erected or maintained and no material or obstruction of
any kind or character shall be placed,
piled, stored, stacked or maintained
closer than eight (8) feet six (6)
inches to the center line of the nearest
track of the Lessor; • • •
Section 11. The Lessee shall be liable for any and all injury or damage to
persons or property, of whatsoever nature
or kind, arising out of or contributed to
by any breach in whole or in part of any
covenant of this agreement.
[Emphasis
added.]
-4-
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Upon appeal appellant addressed only Section 5
of the lease agreement, a general indemnity provision, upon
which petitioner relied as an alternative theory for recovery and ignored Sections 8 and 11 altogether.

This Court

followed appellant's lead and reversed the trial court,
discussing only its finding of inadequacy as to Section 5
while omitting any consideration of petitioner's primary
contention.
In light of the fact that petitioner was the prevailing party at trial and that judgment was based upon
Sections 8 and 11, it is submitted that the Supreme Court
erred in failing to consider or address the merits of
recovery on the basis of those sections.
POINT II
THE SUPREME COURT'S REASONING WITH RESPECT
TO SECTION 5 OF THE SUBJECT LEASE AGREEMENT
WOULD NOT PRECLUDE SUSTAINING THE TRIAL COURT'S
JUDGMENT ON THE THEORY OF BREACH OF CONTRACT
UNDER THE TERMS OF SECTIONS 8 AND 11 OF THE
AGREEMENT.
It is significant to note that the provisions of
Sections 8 and 11 of the subject agreement do not mention
the concept of negligence and/or fault.

Section 8 exacts

a covenant from Intermountain Farmers Association not to
place, pile, store, stack or maintain any materials or
-5Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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obstructions of any kind or character closer than 8 1 6 11 to
the center line of the nearest Union Pacific track.

Section

11 provides that Intermountain Farmers Association shall be
liable for any and all injuries to any person "arising out
of or contributed to by any breach in whole or in part of
any covenant of this agreement"

(emphasis added).

It is undisputed that at the time Mr. Richins sustained his injury the spool of cable which his foot hit was
located within the proscribed clearance zone (Stipulation,
,, 26).

Furthermore, it is also undisputed that Intermoun-

tain Farmers owned the spool of cable (Stipulation, ,,,, 5,
25, and 28) which caused Mr. Richins' injuries.

Consequent-

ly, it is clear that the provisions of Section 8 of the
agreement were breached by the mere existence of this spool
of cable in the proscribed clearance zone and that Union
Pacific is entitled to full indemnity in accordance with
the provisions of Section 11 of the agreement regardless of
negligence or fault.
In Minneapolis-Moline Co. v. Chicago, M., ST. P.

& P. R. Co., 199 F.2d 725 (8th Cir. 1952), the railroad
sought contractual indemnity, under clauses similar to
those in issue here, from an industry in a situation where
one of the industry's employees had been injured when a
train struck a metal box located within the proscribed minimum clearance requirements of the industry track contract.

-6-
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The court, in holding that the railroad was entitled to
recover full indemnity from the industry, ruled (1) that
the railroad, in making the contract covering property
located on its right of way, acted in a private capacity
and not as a common carrier and, consequently, could exact
its own conditions as to occupancy;

(2) that the industry's

obligation to keep the tracks unobstructed was absolute and
unqualified;

(3) that the industry's liability doesn't

depend upon negligence or tort but that such liability
arises from breach of contract; and (4) that the industry
could have made negligence a condition of liability but
since it didn't it would not be heard to complain of the
choice it made.

With particular application to the present

case is the statement of the court at page 731:
The Railroad Company's cause of action
against the Moline Company, however, is
not primarily based upon tort, nor is~
it dependent upon negligence. The liability of the Moline Company arises
from its breach of this indemnity provision of the contract. The rule as to
proximate cause is not available to the
Moline Company because by its contract
it agreed to indemnify against loss
"from and against any and all damages,
remote as well as proximate, in any
wise resulting from any non-performance
or non-observance of the foregoing covenant concerning lateral distance or perpendicular height, for which the Railway
Company shall become, in whole or in
part, liable or be charged." The jury,
in answer to an interrogatory proposed
by appellant, found that plaintiff's
injuries resulted in whole or in part

-7Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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from "the presence of the trash box within
six feet laterally at right angles from the
nearer rail of track 4." It thus appears
that the damages from which the appellant
agreed to hold the Railroad Company harmless need not have been caused solely by
any negligence on its part, nor was the
act of the Moline Company required to be
the proximate cause of the loss. A liability resulted even though such act were
the remote cause.
The case of John P. Gorman Coal Co. v.
Louisville & N. R. Co., 213 Ky. 551, 281
S.W. 487, is strikingly similar in its
facts to the case at bar.
In that case
the Coal Company agreed to maintain and
keep the tracks free from obstructions
and to hold the Railroad harmless on
account of any loss arising from a violation of the provision.
In the course of
the opinion it is said:
"The obligation to keep the tracks
free from obstruction, and to hold
the appellee harmless from any claims
on account of any failure on appellant's
part to so keep the tracks, is an absolute one. Appellant might have made it
a condition of liability that it should
be guilty of some negligence, but this
it did not do.
It was free to make
any contract it chose so long as it was
not against public policy, and, having
chosen to undertake an absolute liability rather than a qualified one, it
cannot now be heard to complain of the
choice it made."
[Emphasis added.]
In Northern P. Ry. Co. v. National Cylinder G.
Div. of C.C., 2 Wash.App. 338, 467 P.2d 884 (Wash. 1970),
the railroad was awarded full contractual indemnity from a
rail welding contractor for injuries sustained by a railroad employee whose leg was crushed by a moving rail.

The

court took special note of the fact that the agreement was
-8-
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silent on the question of whether the negligence of either
party was relevant to the obligation of the industry to
indemnify the railroad and concludes that causation rather
than negligence controlled.

In this regard, the court

states at pages 887-88:
The trial court commented in its oral
opinion it was significant the agreement
at no point mentioned the word "negligent"
or any concept of fault.
It noted the
language used concerned itself solely with
the occurrence of an incident which would
later give rise to a claim or lawsuit . •
The trial court concluded the agreement was a clear undertaking based upon
causation rather than negligence or fault
and had the intention of the parties been
otherwise, they could clearly and simply
have provided in the agreement that the
obligation to indemnify would be subject
to fault on the part of National in connection with some phase of the welding
operation. . . .
National argues that inasmuch as the
trial court did not find negligence on
its part, it cannot be required to indemnify Northern Pacific. Under the terms
of the indemnity provision of the contract,
the trial court's finding that National's
activities caused the injuries out of
which the claim arose is sufficient to
establish liability.
[Emphasis added.]
See also Louisiana & Arkansas

R~

Co. v. Anthony, 199 F.Supp.

286 (W.D. Ark. 1961), aff'd 316 F.2d 858 (8th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied 375 U.S. 830 (1963).
The public policy considerations which this court
indicated would invalidate Section 5 of the subject lease
agreement are not violated by the terms of Sections 8 and
-9-
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11 of said agreement.

The latter provisions were not con-

templated to insulte Union Pacific from its own negligence,
but rather were included for the purpose of requiring Intermountain Farmers to accept liability for any injury to persons caused in whole or in part by its breach of the contract, i.e., placing or maintaining any materials or obstructions within the proscribed clearance zone specified
in the subject lease.

The court has never held contractual

provisions of this nature and scope to be violative of
public policy.
POINT III
THE SUPREME COURT HAS A DUTY TO AFFIRM THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT IF SUSTAINABLE
UPON ANY LEGAL GROUND OR THEORY APPARENT ON
THE RECORD.
The presumption of validity attached to a trial
court's judgment is a basic tenet of the American judicial
system.

The Utah Supreme Court articulated its view of

this principle in Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 381
P.2d 86 (1963), by stating at page 89:
In considering the soundness of the
trial court's conclusion and judgment .
certain cardinal rules must be kept in
mind:
That the judgment is endowed with
a presumption of validity; that the party attacking it has the burden of affirmatively showing that it is in error; and
that the evidence and all inferences that
fairly and reasonably may be drawn there-
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from must be viewed in the light most
favorable to it.
Not only must the Supreme Court accord the judgment below a presumption of validity, but it has an affirmative obligation to sustain the judgment even if an alternative basis for decision must be found.

This Court cited

5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 1464(1) favorably in Foss,
Lewis & Sons Const. Co. v. General Ins. Co. of America,
30 Utah 2d 290, 517 P.2d 539 (1973), and then adopted that
section as a statement of the law of Utah in Goodsel v.
Dept. of Business Regulation, 523 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1974),
quoting therefrom as follows:
The Appellate Court will affirm the
judgment, order, or decree appealed from
if it is sustainable upon any legal
ground or theory apparent on the record,
even though such ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court
to be the basis of its ruling or action,
and this is true even though such ground
or theory is not urged or argued on
appeal by appellee, was not raised in
the lower court, and was not considered
or passed on by the lower court.
Id. at
1232.
The obligation to sustain the lower court decision where possible is not merely passive or discretionary
but is a duty of this court.

That duty was recognized in

Peterson v. Fowler, 29 Utah 2d 366, 510 P.2d 523 (1973), a
case where summary judgment was sustained on an alternative theory following a determination that the trial court
had granted the summary judgment on an erroneous basis.
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This Court acknowledged:

"It is our duty to sustain the

rulings made if it can be done even though it be upon a matter not urged upon appeal."

Id. at 526 (emphasis added).

This case was followed in the Foss, Lewis case, supra, and
Jones v. Smith, 550 P.2d 194 (Utah 1976), with similar
results.
The inescapable conclusion to be drawn from these
cases is that if the court has a duty to search the record
for theories not raised upon appeal which would support the
ruling, then it has an even greater duty to consider alternative theories which were actively advanced by an appellee
at both the trial and appellate court levels.
If a judgment is to be endowed with a presumption
of validity, if that judgment may have been based on either
of two alternative theories presented to the trial court,
and if an appellant fails to address one of those theories
upon appeal, then the appellant has failed to meet its burden of aff irrnatively showing that the judgment is in error
and it is the duty of this Court to sustain that judgment.
Such is the case involved in this instance.
CONCLUSION
This Court failed in its acknowledged duty to
sustain trial court judgment, where possible, when it
reversed the trial court's decision upon a peripheral issue
advanced by appellant while it ignored the real issue
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advanced by the prevailing party and relied on by the court
below.
This case should be set for rebriefing and reargument, and all matters raised by plaintiff and defendant in
this appeal should be given thorough consideration by this
court, following which the judgment of the district court
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

te n A. Goo sell
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent
600 Union Pacific Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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